Collective Bargaining in Higher Education:  Observations from an ACE Fellow by Rosa, José Antonio, PhD
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy
Volume 6 Achieving Successful Results in Higher
Education Through Collective Bargaining Article 2
December 2014
Collective Bargaining in Higher Education:
Observations from an ACE Fellow
José Antonio Rosa PhD
University of Wyoming, jrosa1@uwyo.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba
Part of the Collective Bargaining Commons, and the Higher Education Commons
This Op-Ed is brought to you for free and open access by The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Collective Bargaining in the
Academy by an authorized editor of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rosa, José Antonio PhD (2014) "Collective Bargaining in Higher Education: Observations from an ACE Fellow," Journal of Collective
Bargaining in the Academy: Vol. 6 , Article 2.
Available at: http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol6/iss1/2
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy  ISSN 1941-8043 
Vol. 6, December, 2014  
© 2014 National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education 
 
Collective Bargaining in Higher Education:  
Observations from an ACE Fellow 
José Antonio Rosa1 
 
“There remains, in the control of higher education, an inherent tension. Colleges 
and universities are expected to respond to the needs of the society of which they 
are a part – while also being free to carry on, without undue interference, their 
essential work.” (Carnegie Foundation, 1982, p. 3) 
 
The tensions identified by the Carnegie Foundation have been present in the academy since 
masters and students in Paris, Oxford, and other centers of knowledge battled for autonomy with 
municipal officials in the thirteenth century (Leff, 1968). We will revisit the relevance of these 
enduring tensions to collective bargaining in the academy later in this essay, but it seemed 
appropriate to mention them now because they help explain the American Council of Education 
(ACE) Fellows program and my involvement. Academic administration is messy, a notion 
recently affirmed by Asghar (2013). It is messy primarily because of these tensions. The 
academy exists at the intersection of conflicting social missions. In order for academicians to do 
their best, administrators and faculty leaders have to manage an inherently unstable social 
ecosystem. The ACE Fellows program, one of the oldest and most recognized academic 
leadership training programs in the U.S., uses an apprenticeship model to prepare emerging 
academic leaders to manage these tensions. I entered the program in August 2013 because of 
wanting to help defend and enhance the academy while recognizing that my 20-year faculty 
perspective was not the full picture. I was fortunate to spend the fellowship year at Eastern 
Illinois University, an institution that sets a high bar in its service to society, responsiveness to 
changing societal and demographic realities, and governance that includes an active and well-
organized collective bargaining unit. My years in the auto industry (including front-line 
supervision in UAW-represented manufacturing environments) had prepared me for some of the 
contractual complexities found at EIU, but not for the different spirit in which problems were 
addressed and differences resolved. If corporate CEOs can learn from university presidents, as 
Asghar (2013) argues, it seems feasible that corporate labor relations can learn from collective 
bargaining management at U.S. colleges and universities. 
My learning from the ACE Fellowship year went beyond the positive example of Eastern 
Illinois University, and the lessons come together to raise questions about the future of collective 
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bargaining in U.S. higher education. Will collective bargaining grow in the academy as 
documented salary and workload inequities grow? Or has collective bargaining outlived its 
usefulness as the way in which post-secondary and graduate education is conducted changes? 
Supporting the idea that collective bargaining will grow in the academy are factors such as 
successful certification efforts at high-profile institutions such as the University of Illinois at 
Chicago and national-level organizing within the part-time academic workforce by the United 
Automobile Workers and the Teamsters Union alongside the American Association of 
University Professors, the National Education Association, and the American Federation of 
Teachers. On the other hand, support for collective bargaining among college and university 
professors is not uniformly strong, and in some cases has led to the successful decertification of 
collective bargaining units (Schontzler, 2013). As an ACE Fellow, and a member of the 
academic community, I find questions about the future of collective bargaining in the academy 
relevant to professors and administrators and important to society. In pondering the future of 
collective bargaining in the academy, a few factors emerge as important. 
Technology Factors 
In general, professors and administrators seem to be both excited and alarmed by the 
proliferation and ubiquity of digital technologies. On the positive side, the workday has 
expanded and grown in flexibility as we are able to complete job-related tasks from anywhere 
and at any time. Research collaborations frequently span the globe in real time, business and 
coordination meetings are conducted as scheduled because absence from campus no longer 
prevents participation, and the range and impact of effective teaching has grown exponentially. 
Conversely, educators face students with real-time access to information (some accurate, some 
not) that either affirms or runs counter to what is being presented and a willingness to share such 
information. And then there are the countless distractions to which students turn readily when the 
classroom experience no longer holds their attention. Administrators and faculty leaders fare no 
better, as they try to bring order and focus to decision-making groups where members are 
checking e-mail, updating calendars, and chasing down YouTube clips that may or may not be 
relevant to the topics being discussed. With a few admirable exceptions, professors, 
administrators, and faculty leaders alike are affected by intrusive technologies. 
Institutions are similarly affected. Cloud computing and storage, barely a possibility at the 
turn of the century, make it possible for institutions large and small to have equal access to 
limitless information and countless services, and to have practically equal influence in a 
knowledge marketplace that is no longer constrained by geographic location. The range of 
possibilities for classroom experiences (hybrid courses, flipped classrooms, MOOCs and their 
variants) make learning assessments and performance evaluations more complex. Physical 
facilities such as offices, classrooms, and meeting spaces at many institutions go underutilized, 
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while information systems and infrastructure perpetually need upgrading. Revenue sources and 
sustainability are changing rapidly, as are investment demands, in part because of fast-changing 
technologies, and the management of institutional resources, human, fiscal, and physical has 
grown more complex as a result.  
Technology has multiplied variance in how work is done in colleges and universities, and 
complicated performance and compliance tracking for all parties involved. It has also broadened 
the settings in which faculty members work and attain desired goals, and even for whom they 
work. University administrators are known to bemoan that professors can now contract to deliver 
online courses for other institutions from their offices, and by so doing dilute the energy and 
commitment with which they serve home colleges and universities. Professors’ ability to work 
virtually and undetected, I learned during my ACE Fellowship year, is seen by some distance-
education institutions as a strategic resource to be exploited. Entrepreneurial professors are 
likewise enthralled by the autonomy and enhanced income potential that technology creates. I 
met some professors during ACE Fellowship campus visits, who are successfully harnessing 
technology to serve multiple institutions. In general, they see themselves as independent from 
their universities, and they resent having to support collective bargaining or abide by their norms.  
Some questions that arose from these meetings are: Can collective bargaining units effectively 
represent faculty who are only partially engaged with their home institutions? And does this 
weakening of collective bargaining units’ ability to represent the faculty weaken their ability to 
negotiate? I do not have answers to these and similar questions that arise as technology changes 
pedagogical practice in the academy, but the questions are worth pondering by higher education 
and collective bargaining unit leaders.  Technology is revolutionizing higher education delivery 
and execution. It may be shifting the mode of governance as well. 
Societal Factors 
Employability as the primary reason for higher education is a major social factor affecting 
the academy. Perhaps because the notion of education as a pathway to a better life regardless of 
gender, location, language, or skin color has held for decades (an idea that in aggregate terms 
remains true), in times of economic stress and instability hundreds of thousands have sought 
education to offset their actual or perceived losses, and higher education institutions have 
responded accordingly. Since the 1980s, the number of higher education institutions and 
programs has expanded, and for a short time price seemed to be of little concern. Double-digit 
annual increases in tuition and fees did not seem to affect the demand for post-secondary and 
graduate degrees, and much of it was tacitly motivated by one overarching concern—
employability. Need a better job? Get more education. Want a wider array of opportunities? Get 
an advanced degree. 
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Employability concerns may have well been the driving factor in much of the expansion in 
higher education opportunities and revenues since the 1980s, but it was not directly 
acknowledged as such until the Great Recession exposed several disconnects between labor 
market needs and what students seem to be learning. Employers under financial pressures have 
become increasingly choosy in their hiring while simultaneously reducing their workforce, and 
people who in 2005-2006 embarked on courses of study found themselves unable to get the 
attention of employers in 2010-2011. The general rule that education opened doors and expanded 
opportunities no longer seemed to hold for many, and the number of college-educated 
unemployed persons reached levels that forced the rule’s breakdown into the national limelight. 
A college education no longer seemed to guarantee a better life. The social shock has been 
significant, and the end result has been a questioning of the value of higher education, and 
perhaps more important, of the integrity of higher education institutions. 
Questions about the integrity and value of higher education have, in turn, generated a fair 
amount of finger pointing and speculation about possible causes. Speculative statements such as 
professors are lazy and overpaid, administrators are incompetent, colleges and universities need 
better business models, and higher education does not seem to understand or care for what the 
country needs pepper the national conversation. Not surprisingly, some blame collective 
bargaining in higher education (and other educational sectors) as a key contributor to 
inefficiencies and disconnects, and such arguments are amplified by the country’s current 
ideological polarization. Admittedly, some university administrators have taken advantage of the 
public’s mood to undermine organizing efforts and existing collective bargaining units, but such 
attacks are no more valid in higher education than in other economic sectors. Pointing to 
collective bargaining as the primary cause of higher education missteps and college graduates 
not finding jobs is unjust, but it is happening. Moreover, it is hard to predict how long such ideas 
will persist in the public’s mind and inform policy and attitudes. 
As with technology, social factors present challenges and opportunities for collective 
bargaining in higher education. Economic inequality and the mismatches between labor supply 
and demand (which have encouraged opportunistic workload redistributions at some institutions) 
should greatly enhance the attractiveness of collective bargaining for many professors and staff 
personnel across the spectrum of higher education institutions. At the same time, general distrust 
of higher education and unions may generate public resistance to collective bargaining efforts at 
colleges and universities, and may even influence the choosing of an institution for some 
students and families.  
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Historical and Policy Factors 
Putting aside environmental factors such as technology and social trends, which may 
change rapidly and unexpectedly, it is wise to consider some enduring factors that have shaped 
and continue to affect the role of collective bargaining in the academy. One factor is the long-
standing mission of collective bargaining units: to ensure equity in work demands and 
compensation for faculty and staff in organizations that are, by design, administratively and 
operationally loosely-coupled. The academy thrives on a diversity of thought and execution 
across disciplines, diversity that in the aggregate engenders creativity. Because the boundaries 
between what is done and how it is done are fuzzy, differences in the priorities of autonomous 
units and departments within colleges and universities are likely to engender different managerial 
and administrative practices if left unchecked, and institutional size only serves to intensify such 
differences. Collective bargaining in higher education has made it a priority to develop 
workload, working conditions, and compensation guidelines that protect employee interests . In 
practice, collective bargaining practices have encouraged homogeneity in how curricula are 
developed, assessments made, and work rewarded. In an age of increased customization and 
workplace flexibility, however, are work rules and across-the-board standards necessary or even 
desirable? Is there a fundamental disconnect between what collective bargaining units seek to 
achieve and how institutions of higher learning need to function? These are questions we debated 
in the ACE Fellowship year without arriving at answers. They seem worthwhile for university 
and collective bargaining unit leaders to consider for their institutions. 
A second factor is the professionalization of university administration in response to 
growing fiscal and operational demands. Gone are the days when university professors could rise 
to administrative posts by virtue of organizational memory and a willingness to serve. The 
accelerating rate at which expectations change has not reduced complexity, but it has increased 
the speed with which decisions must be made and outcomes measured and elevated 
administrative pressures. Are modern administrative practices, made necessary by growing and 
changing demands, compatible with traditional collective bargaining values and approaches? 
Does compliance with such practices slow down administrative decision-making and take away 
degrees of freedom to such an extent that the institution’s competitiveness and efficacy are 
compromised? Higher education may not yet have answers, but in several industry sectors (e.g., 
automotive, steel, retailing) collective bargaining practices have changed in order to preserve 
organizational competitiveness. It is possible that higher education must follow suit. 
A third factor stems from higher education’s enduring mission and how it will be 
successfully achieved in the 21st century. For close to nine centuries, the academy has exercised 
authority to select who will teach, the content of courses, the processes of instruction, the 
establishment of academic standards and performance assessments, the pursuit of campus-based 
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research, and the certification of such pursuits. Defending this authority is an enduring challenge. 
As recently as 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court had to reaffirm “the four essential freedoms of the 
university; to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how 
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”2 It is ironic, but not altogether surprising, 
that the ruling was against the state where 138 years earlier Daniel Webster legally defended the 
independence of Dartmouth College in order to protect its academic integrity. The academy is 
both treasured and feared by society at large, and its freedoms will continually be under scrutiny. 
There are times when the essential core of the university collides with other values of equal 
merit, such as the right of individuals to be fairly evaluated and rewarded (or punished) for work 
rendered (or not rendered), and the right to be treated equitably relative to others with similar 
capabilities and responsibilities. When these rights are violated, and equity is compromised, the 
university is at risk. For the academy to earn self-determination, it must be its strongest critic, 
and collective bargaining units may be, in many situations, essential to this accomplishment. 
In a perfect world, collective bargaining units will work hard to expose inequities and 
inefficiencies within their institutions, to right wrongs and make institutions better places to work 
and learn, and to preserve institutional viability for the benefit of all constituents, but they will do 
so within institutional boundaries. They will not involve persons and organizations outside the 
institution needlessly, and they will not engage in practices, be they playing to the legislative 
process, or using the media to skew public perceptions, in ways that weaken the institution’s 
reputation and ability to defend its independence. When collective bargaining units undermine 
institutional authority and integrity for the sake of short-term contract gains, the odds for long-
term losses go up for all concerned. Admittedly, to achieve their diverse temporal goals, 
successful collective bargaining units have had to alter their methods as the forces encroaching 
on academic authority and independence have evolved; but they have not compromised on 
values or commitment to academic autonomy. Given the significant social, economic, and 
technological changes facing higher education, and what appears to be growing social distrust, 
the time may be ripe for collective bargaining to revisit its methods and mental models. Boris 
(2014) has advanced persuasive arguments in this arena. Collective bargaining in higher 
education needs to find ways to be successful behind closed doors and to own those decisions 
once the outside world gets involved. 
Ideas for the Future 
Building on the idea that collective bargaining units are needed at many colleges and 
universities to protect institutional viability while also preserving academic autonomy, it seems 
wise to look for approaches to collective bargaining that are compatible with market and social 
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realities and which allow for the academy to manage its own affairs with only limited external 
intrusions. Fortunately, the academy is not alone in needing collective bargaining and autonomy 
preservation to co-exist, and it can learn from what has been done in other industry sectors. 
Valuable insights can be gleaned from the manner in which the United Auto Workers and 
the Ford Motor Company worked to keep the company out of bankruptcy and away from 
government control during the Great Recession. The multi-year collaboration is well documented 
(Hoffman, 2012), and in the eyes of industry observers helped to not only save the Ford Motor 
Company but to give it a competitive advantage from which it continues to benefit. By avoiding 
a government bailout, Ford Motor Company was able to streamline and improve its managerial 
practices, and effectively respond to fast-changing auto and truck market demands more quickly 
than its global competitors. As a result, it has gained global market share while also protecting 
US-based jobs.  
Three general principles can be gleaned from the Ford-UAW collaboration: senior 
leadership involvement, transparency, and flexibility. 
On senior leadership involvement, the Ford-UAW collaboration that saved the company 
was partially made possible by Ford CEO Alan Mulally and UAW President Ron Gettelfinger 
having frank conversations about the situation at Ford and the UAW, the threats facing the 
company and the union, and different strategic options and their consequences. These 
conversations  allowed them to arrive at a mutually agreeable contract. Admittedly, Mulally and 
Gettelfinger knew each other before Mulally took over at Ford because of UAW representation 
of Boeing employees. This served to facilitate the initial conversation. However, the fact remains 
that both leaders, regardless of the companies or union chapters involved, were willing to share 
openly. They were willing to make themselves vulnerable to external criticism for the sake of 
solutions to vexing problems, and to have heated arguments behind closed doors but jointly own 
decisions once made. Neither Mulally nor Gettelfinger stopped pursuing the interests of their 
respective organizations. Mulally won concessions on employment, plant closures, and cost-
sharing that helped the company avoid bankruptcy, while Gettelfinger won job security and 
continuing benefits for UAW members under adverse market conditions.  
Second, as higher education practices in the U.S. continue to change and external pressures 
escalate, it is important for top-level institution and bargaining unit leaders to redouble their 
pursuit of frank and open communication. They need to willingly accept criticism from their 
constituencies as negotiations unfold, to negotiate aggressively and wisely, and to courageously 
own the outcomes of such negotiations. Even if the worst-case scenario of a leader being ousted 
because of decisions arising from such a process were to unfold, the likelihood of institutional 
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viability and greater responsiveness to external factors is enhanced when top-level leaders are 
part of the collective bargaining process. 
Transparency is equally indispensable. Under orders from Mulally and Gettelfinger, Ford 
and the UAW shared detailed information about all aspects of company and union concerns. 
Financial records were made available, successes and failures were discussed in detail, and 
ambiguities clarified. Hoffman (2012) argues that by the end of negotiations UAW leadership 
knew as much about Ford Motor Company operations as Ford’s senior leaders and that they fully 
understood the risks facing the company and the auto industry. Transparency served to improve 
the quality and sustainability of resulting contract provisions. It also elevated trust and the 
willingness to share risks between the company and the union. In higher education, budgetary 
complexities are sometimes used to avoid information sharing, be it with faculty, staff, students, 
or collective bargaining units. Lack of transparency, in turn, invites speculation and conflicting 
stories about institutional finances and the availability or absence of resources, and hinders 
shared understanding and mutually agreeable action plans. Ford and the UAW achieved 
unprecedented collaboration at a time of crisis because they understood one another’s situations 
well. Similar levels of shared understanding would be welcome in the academy. 
The third principle is flexibility. When Ford and the UAW started negotiations, market 
uncertainties over global employment, interest rates, and world financial system stability were 
overwhelming to most industry and government leaders. Early decisions were based on 
assumptions and hopes that later proved false or untenable, and contract provisions had to be 
renegotiated repeatedly. Ford encountered market demand problems that worsened its situation, 
and the UAW encountered difficulties with the GM and Chrysler negotiations that forced a 
reopening of some earlier-negotiated concessions. Commitments to flexibility were made early 
and tested repeatedly during the negotiation process. Because of such cognitive and operational 
flexibility, negotiations did not stall. 
The academy faces significant uncertainty stemming from political, technological, 
financial, and social environments, and it is hard to project ahead to how many institutions of 
higher learning will remain viable or how they will function. Collective bargaining units and 
institutional leaders need to approach negotiations with an open mind as to work loads, 
compensation and benefits, employment levels, work rules, evaluations of achievement, and the 
many other areas of concern that appear in labor contracts. Some early agreements will prove 
untenable, and late developments will open unforeseen opportunities for mutual gain. When 
cognitive and operational flexibility are preserved, successful negotiations in the face of high 
uncertainty are more likely. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
Admittedly, operationalizing senior leadership involvement, transparency, and flexibility in 
specific situations is where the challenges truly lie. Institutional histories are hard to overcome, 
and cultural differences between institutions can render an approach that succeeds in one 
situation an abysmal failure in others. The Ford-UAW negotiations were, in part, made possible 
by the historical context in which they took place. The right people came together at the right 
time. Given that situations were similar at GM and Chrysler but outcomes differed. However, we 
should not discount the Ford-UAW success as merely a historical accident. Leaders and 
organizations committed to sound principles achieved success where others failed. The same can 
be true for higher education. I believe that collective bargaining is integral to the proper 
functioning of many higher education institutions in the US. What is needed from institutional 
and bargaining unit leaders is a rethinking of collective bargaining approaches in the face of 
changing technological, societal, historical, and policy realities. 
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